COMMAND /handwritten (81/3/)
3rd ARMY – FORWARD COMMAND POST
Strictly confidential No. 872-94/1-2
25 May 1999

MILITARY SECRET STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

/handwritten: 72/

Copy No.______

Attachment of units and organs of MUP /Ministry of the Interior/ of the Republic of Serbia Report

TO: SUPREME COMMAND STAFF - Chief of Staff in person –

Pursuant to your Order Strictly Confidential No. 01/2024-1 of 18 April 1999 and the Order of the 3rd Army Command Strictly Confidential No. 872-99/1 of 20 April 1999 regarding the resubordination of units and organs of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia to the 3rd Army Command, more specifically to the Commands of the Priština and Niš Corps, we report officially as follows:

- 1. The resubordination of the MUP forces to the forces of VJ /Army of Yugoslavia/ has not been carried out in the spirit of the above order for several reasons, the most important among them being: a) the inherited peacetime autonomy of these units and the related conduct of their command personnel in practice and b) the order of the NŠVK /Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command/ was not accompanied by a corresponding order from the Minister of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia. In this regard all our attempts to resolve the above-mentioned problem on the ground by involving the most senior officers in the commands of the 3rd Army and the Priština Corps have not produced any tangible results so far apart from general promises of individual commanders and leaders of the lower echelons of the MUP PJP /Special Police Units/. In consequence, the Priština Corps brigade commanders do not command the above-mentioned structures in their areas.
- 2. The non-compliance with the orders on resubordination has entailed problems concerning joint operations of the VJ units and the MUP forces in combat because it has so far been impossible to resolve numerous related questions (inter-spaces in combat, artillery support, unreasonable delays in the execution of tasks, unnecessary losses in combat, control of the territory and communications, problems involving the civilian population and refugees and the like).
- 3. The security regime in the territory has not taken root in the spirit of the law and on the basis of the proclaimed state of war. The best example is the operation of the joint checkpoints manned by the MUP and Military Police units, where there are frequent altercations because MUP members condone or openly permit evident criminal activities and plunder committed by their fellow MUP members as well as civilians resulting in the misappropriation of a vast number of motor vehicles, technical goods and other resources from the territory of KiM /Kosovo and Metohija/.

- 4. It has been established beyond doubt, and we have already reported on it in regular combat and other reports, that due to the non-compliance with the resubordination orders, some MUP members and to a considerable extent entire smaller units, which "operate" independently on the ground are committing serious crimes against the *Šiptar* /derogatory for Albanian/ civilian population in settlements or refugee shelters murder, rape, plunder, robbery aggravated, theft, etc., and they then purposefully attribute or plan to attribute those crimes to units and individuals in the VJ.
- 5. The question of the clearing up of the battlegrounds in the brigade areas has so far been solved successfully, except in the areas where MUP units have conducted combat operations based on their plans. To our knowledge, MUP performed the clearing up only in part or not at all.
- 6. The co-operation with the organs of the State Security Department in KiM is not good either, as we have not received yet a single piece of information regarding members of the VJ reserve force. The exchanges of operative and other information are few and far between, and the information "served" to us about *Šiptar* terrorist forces is frequently general and inaccurate, leading to the unnecessary exhausting of unit commands, and particularly the security agencies engaging in their verification.
- 7. The only positive example in the engagement and functioning of the MUP in the conduct of war so far is the location and detention of military conscripts who fail to report or desert, which is accompanied by objective and understandable difficulties.

MEASURES PROPOSED: In the light of the above-said, and particularly the consequences already in evidence, which could, however, become much more important, the Supreme Command should take urgent measures falling within its jurisdiction to resubordinate the units and organs of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia in the spirit of the Constitution and existing laws, and in accordance with the proclaimed state of war, or annul the Order on their resubordination and leave the command and commanding /as printed/ of the forces of the MUP of the Republic Serbia in the hands of the Ministry of the Interior – Staff of the MUP of the Republic of Serbia for KiM through the Joint Command as has so far been the case.

NP/BV

C O M M A N D E R Colonel-general Nebojša PAVKOVIĆ /signed and stamped/